Date:08/15/92
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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Reviewed by NSA on 1/10/94 [illegible] Release in Part

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~ LANSDALE, TAYLOR, ~~JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK,~~ MCCONE, RFK, ~~LEMNITZER,~~	July 11, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." Memo quotes NSA summary on intelligence problems which notes that "Intelligence has been obtained of Soviet participation in Cuban tactical air training, Cuban air defense performance, and the presence of Soviet-type air defense equipments." Sec 6(1)(b)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962 (00428-00430)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HELMS PRESIDENT KENNEDY MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25,1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that "each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections. Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF: diGenova

DATE: 2/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] Peter Grace	Dec. 5, 1960	Mongoose ✓ Special Group

OCCURRENCE: The Special Group discussed (1) the possibility of providing sixty thousand dollars from the Cuba budget [redacted]; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that ~~the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000."~~ Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.

SOURCE: Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED~~ ~~MONGOOSE~~, TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, CARTER, LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT	July 12, 1962 ~~July 20, 1962~~ ~~April 9, 1963~~	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)

FILE:

STAFF: (continued)

di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

Denied in full by CIA, 4 Feb 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE, HARVEY, RUZ [redacted]	July 10, 1962 ~~June, 11, 1962~~ ~~July 1, 1962~~ ~~May 1962~~	MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Rug, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. [redacted] contacted Ruz [redacted] in [redacted] Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Ruz in Mexico.

SOURCE: Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re: Juana Castro Ruz, 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

[redacted]

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRES. KENNEDY, HARVEY, TAYLOR Duque	MAY 7, 1962	MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED

OCCURRENCE: Memo: "I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. HARVEY'S briefing of the SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED on 3 MAY 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the DUQUE incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed we would continue along ~~the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August.~~"

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, REPORT OF PROGRESS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, MAY 7, 1962, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (00024)

FILE:

STAFF: DiGenova

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MR. GRAY MR. GEHLEN	Oct 6, 1960	Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization Card 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

On October 6, 1960 the Special Group discussed relating to CUBA:

(1) Explanation by MR. DULLES of the "abortive supply drop to resistance elements" in Cuba.

(2) MR. DULLES' proposal for U-2 coverage of CUBA "All the members of the group said that they were in favor of proceeding with the coverage." Mr. Gray asked to have the memorandums on which Mr. Dulles had based his presentation forwarded to him for use in getting the required decision.

Mr. Dulles' proposal for use of American volunteers and foreign nationals in the Cuban operation. The group agreed Mr. Dulles could begin screening lists of potential candidates. Dulles added that there might be a possibility of

(continued)

SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
	Oct. 6, 1960	Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960	Bob Kelley
FILE: Cage	DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE [redacted]		MONGOOSE ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

McCone testified that he recalled that activity to sabotage the shipment of spare parts [redacted] to Cuba. He did not recall whether it was [redacted] spare parts. (23).

SOURCE:	STAFF:
McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75	Rhea
FILE:	DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/ is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. ~~The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187,~~ included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; [redacted]. (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

Reviewed by NSA on 1/10/94 [illegible] Release in Part

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for NSA deletions, (1)(B) & (C) 2/8/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 1 Feb 94 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HELMS, LANSDALE,	Feb. 1, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Memo for Richard Helms from Gen. Lansdale concerning NSA cover. The memo alludes to a conversation on the previous day, Jan. 31, 1962, about NSA cover for the Cuba Project. It indicates that Cuba cover is top priority. It indicated that this was not possibly known to the members of the United States Intelligence Board. The problem seemed to be to be able to decide how much of NSA (National Security Agency)'s assets were needed to provide cover for the Cuban project. Sec 6(1)(b)(c)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for Richard Helms from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, dated Feb. 1, 1962 (00122)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 29, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/ is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, 'how serious are you?', before risking their assets to help the U.S." (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Helms, Richard [redacted]	1962	Castro Mongoose ✓

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no limitations were placed on the means. In fact, I never recall having been told by anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26) (The above statements refer to Mongoose.) Helms testified that "the pressure was very intense and I remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several "very nutty schemes." (26) Helms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pigs and then lay dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. Afterwards interest tapered off, although Helms recalled efforts in 1963 involving "economic warfare" such as turning off oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries [redacted]

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/28/75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: | CATEGORIES:

(continuation)

Card 2 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

meeting of foreign ministers which opened January 22, 1962. The object was to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the hemisphere. "The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America generated by CIA and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA." The major task of the diplomatic capability was to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to the instant project seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. In the economic warfare area an embargo on Cuban trade was to be considered after the OAS meeting. The CIA was unable to undertake the action to sabotage the sugar harvest which commences about January 15 and upon which Cuba's one-crop economy depended. Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking in cane fields was explored, according to Lansdale's review. Special sabotage support was noted.→

SOURCE: | STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
(continuation)		Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "lubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:	STAFF:
FILE:	DATE:

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CARD 3		Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE, , Y,	Mar 13, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓ CUBA

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills ~~as well as intelligence collection,~~...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Opa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating [redacted] British help [redacted] contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, 13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, TAYLOR, R KENNEDY, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK GEN. DECKER, LANSDALE, CRAIG, MCCONE, HARVEY, PARROTT DUQUE	MAY 3, 1962	SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: LANSDALE gave interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the US Army. "The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number." Mr. HARVEY "gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence." He said, "that three agent teams have been infiltrated." "A significant development is that Major DUQUE has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely intelligence-gathering missions." HARVEY also reported on two attempts made to intrude into Havana TV programs.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED ON PROJECT MONGOOSE, 3 MAY 1962. (00023)

STAFF: DiGenova

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, LANSDALE [redacted]	June 19, 1962	MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate a story from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The Cuban source to story need not await your determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration."

TOP

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, from Lansdale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (00395)	di Genova
FILE:	DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

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SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

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SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 ✓ 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

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SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)	di Genova
FILE:	DATE: July 1, 1975